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Abstract
We report on a man-in-the-middle attack on PKINIT, the public key extension of the widely deployed Kerberos 5
authentication protocol. This ﬂaw allows an attacker to impersonate Kerberos administrative principals (KDC) and end-
servers to a client, hence breaching the authentication guarantees ofKerberos. It also gives the attacker the keys that theKDC
would normally generate to encrypt the service requests of this client, hence defeating conﬁdentiality as well. The discovery
of this attack caused the IETF to change the speciﬁcation of PKINIT and Microsoft to release a security update for some
Windows operating systems. We discovered this attack as part of an ongoing formal analysis of the Kerberos protocol suite,
and we have formally veriﬁed several possible ﬁxes to PKINIT—including the one adopted by the IETF—that prevent our
attack as well as other authentication and secrecy properties of Kerberos with PKINIT.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Kerberos [1] is a successful, widely deployed single sign-on protocol that is designed to authenticate clients to
multiple networked services, e.g., remote hosts, ﬁle servers, or print spoolers. Kerberos 5, themost recent version,
is available for all major operating systems: Microsoft has included it in its Windows operating system, it is
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available for Linux under the name Heimdal, and commercial Unix variants as well as Apple’s OS X use code
from the MIT implementation of Kerberos 5. Furthermore, it is being used as a building block for higher-level
protocols [2]. Introduced in the early 1990s [3], Kerberos 5 continues to evolve as new functionalities are added to
the basic protocol. One of these extensions, known as PKINIT, modiﬁes the basic protocol to allow public-key
authentication and in the process adds considerable complexity to the protocol. Here we report a protocol-level
attack on PKINIT and discuss the constructive process of ﬁxing it. We have veriﬁed a few defenses against our
attack, including one we suggested, a different one proposed in the IETFKerberos working group (and included
the ﬁnal PKINIT speciﬁcation), and a generalization of these two approaches.
A Kerberos session generally starts with a user logging onto a system. This triggers the creation of a client
process that will transparently handle all her authentication requests. The initial authentication between the
client and the Kerberos administrative principals (altogether known as the KDC, for Key Distribution Center)
is traditionally based on a shared key derived from a password chosen by the user. PKINIT is intended to
add ﬂexibility, security and administrative convenience by replacing this static shared secret with two pairs
of public/private keys, one assigned to the KDC and one belonging to the user. PKINIT is supported by
Kerberized versions ofMicrosoftWindows, typically for use with smartcard authentication, includingWindows
2000 Professional and Server, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 and now Windows Vista [4]; it has also been
included in Heimdal since 2002 [5]. The MIT reference implementation is being extended with PKINIT.
The ﬂaw we have uncovered in PKINIT allows an attacker to impersonate the KDC, and therefore all
the Kerberized services, to a user, hence defeating authentication of the server to the client. The attacker also
obtains all the keys that the KDC would normally generate for the client to encrypt her service requests,
hence compromising conﬁdentiality as well. This is a protocol-level attack and was a ﬂaw in the then-current
speciﬁcation, not just a particular implementation. In contrast to recently reported attacks on Kerberos 4 [6],
our attack does not use an oracle, but is efﬁciently mounted in constant time by simply decrypting a message
with one key, changing one important value, and re-encrypting it with the victim’s public key. The consequences
of this attack are quite serious. For example, the attacker could monitor communication between an honest
client and a Kerberized network ﬁle server. This would allow the attacker to read the ﬁles that the client believes
are being securely transferred to the ﬁle server.
Our attack is possible because the two messages constituting PKINIT were insufﬁciently bound to each
other.1 More precisely, the reply (the second message of this exchange) can easily be modiﬁed so that it appears
to correspond to a request (the ﬁrst message) sent by a client different from the one the reply is generated for.
Assumptions required for this attack are that the attacker is a legal user, that he can intercept other clients’
requests, and that PKINIT is used in “public-key encryption mode”. The alternative “Difﬁe–Hellman (DH)
mode” does not appear vulnerable to this attack; we are in the process of proving its full security.
We discovered this attack as part of an ongoing formal analysis of the Kerberos 5 protocol suite. Our earlier
work on Kerberos successfully employed formal methods for the veriﬁcation of the authentication properties of
basic intra-realm Kerberos 5 [7,8] and of cross-realm authentication [8,9]. Although our work is carried out by
hand, a variety of automated approaches exist for symbolic proofs [10–17] and have also been applied to deployed
protocols (e.g., [18–20]). In a recent collaboration with M. Backes, we have started extending our results from
the abstract Dolev–Yao model examined here to the more concrete computational model [21]. Interestingly,
the results described in more detail here served as a blueprint for the much more ﬁne-grained proofs in [21].
Furthermore, we have started exploring automated security proofs of Kerberos [22] using the tool CryptoVerif
[23,24], which works directly within the computational model.
After discovering the attack on PKINIT, we worked in close collaboration with the IETF Kerberos Working
Group, in particular with the authors of the PKINIT speciﬁcation documents, to correct the problem. Our
contribution in this regard has been a formal analysis of a general countermeasure to this attack, as well as the
particular instance proposed by the Working Group that has been adopted in the PKINIT speciﬁcation [25].
Our attack led to an August 2005 Microsoft Security Bulletin and patch [4]. It was also recorded as a CERT
advisory [26]. This paper extends our preliminary report [27] with additional authentication properties, full
proofs of our results, and a more complete discussion of our techniques, formalization, and the protocol itself.
1 The possibility of an ‘identity misbinding’ attack was independently hypothesized by Ran Canetti, whom we consulted on some details
of the speciﬁcation.
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Fig. 1. An Overview of Kerberos Authentication.
Below, in Section 2 we recall the structure of Kerberos and give a detailed description of PKINIT. In Section
3 we provide an account of the attack we uncovered and outline its consequences. In Section 4 we discuss various
approaches to prevent the attack, including the one adopted by the IETF Kerberos working group in response
to our work. In Section 5 we review our representation language, MSR, and use it to formalize the ﬁxed version
of PKINIT; we give some of our formal results—that the ﬁxed version does prevent our attack and that both
the broken and ﬁxed versions have other authentication and secrecy properties—in Section 6. Section 7 provides
some concluding remarks.
2. Kerberos 5 and its public-key extension
The Kerberos protocol [1] allows a legitimate user to log on to her terminal once a day (typically) and then
transparently access all the networked resources she needs in her organization for the rest of that day. Each
time she wants to retrieve a ﬁle from a remote server, for example, Kerberos securely handles the required
authentication behind the scene, without any user intervention.
We now review how Kerberos provides secure authentication based on a single logon. As we do this, we will
be particularly interested in the initial exchange, which happens when the user ﬁrst logs onto the system. Figure
1 gives an overview of the message ﬂow for the entire Kerberos protocol; Fig. 4 below reﬁnes this to show some
of the message details for the basic protocol. We start this section with a detailed review of the ﬁrst exchange in
the protocol, both with and without PKINIT.
2.1. Kerberos basics
The client process—usually acting on behalf of a human user—interacts with three other types of principals
during the three rounds of Kerberos 5 (with or without PKINIT). The client’s goal is to be able to authen-
ticate herself to various application servers (e.g., email, ﬁle, and print servers). This is done by ﬁrst obtaining
credentials, called the “ticket-granting ticket” (TGT), from a “Kerberos Authentication Server” (KAS) and
then by presenting these credentials to a “Ticket-Granting Server” (TGS) in order to obtain a “service ticket”
(ST), which is the credentials that the client ﬁnally presents to the application servers in order to authenticate
herself (see Fig. 1). A TGT might be valid for a day, and may be used to obtain several STs for many different
application servers from the TGS, while a single ST might be valid for a few minutes (although it, too, may
be used repeatedly while it is still valid) and is used for a single application server. The KAS and the TGS are
altogether known as the “Key Distribution Center” (KDC).
The client’s interactions with the KAS, TGS, and application servers are called the Authentication Service
(AS), Ticket-Granting (TG), and Client-Server (CS) exchanges, respectively. The focus of this work will be the
AS exchange, as PKINIT does not alter the remaining parts of Kerberos.
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Fig. 2. Message Flow in the Traditional AS Exchange where TGT = {AK ,C , tK }kT .
The traditional authentication service exchange. The abstract structure of the messages in the traditional (non-
PKINIT) AS exchange is given in Fig. 2. A clientC generates a fresh nonce n1 and sends it, together with her own
name and the name T of the TGS for whom she desires a TGT, to the KAS. The KAS responds by generating
a fresh key AK for use between the client and the TGS. This key is sent back to the client, along with the nonce
(n1) from the request, at timestamp (tK ) and other data, encrypted under a long-term key kC shared between C
and the KAS; this long-term key is usually derived from the user’s password. We write {m}k for the encryption
of m with symmetric key k . This is the only time that this long-term key is used in a standard Kerberos run
because later exchanges use freshly generated keys. AK is also included in the TGT, sent alongside the message
encrypted for the client. The TGT is encrypted under a long-term key kT shared between the KAS and the TGS
named in the request. These encrypted messages are accompanied by the client’s name—and other data that we
abstract away—sent in the clear. Once the client has received this reply, she may undertake the ticket-granting
exchange.
It should be noted that the actual AS exchange, as well as the other exchanges in Kerberos, are more complex
than the abstract view given here; the details we omit here do not affect our results and including them would
only obscure their exposition. We refer the reader to [1] for the complete speciﬁcation of Kerberos 5, and to [7]
for a formalization at an intermediate level of detail.
Security considerations. One weakness of the standard Kerberos protocol is that the key kC used to encrypt the
client’s credentials is derived from a password, and passwords are notoriously vulnerable to dictionary attacks
[1]. Moreover, since the initial request is entirely plaintext, an active attacker can repeatedly make requests for an
honest client’s credentials and amass a large quantity of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the latter component being
encrypted with the client’s long-term key kC . While the attacker is unable to use these credentials to authenticate
to the system, he is given considerable opportunity to perform an active dictionary attack against the key.
Kerberos can optionally use pre-authentication, a feature that is designed to prevent an attacker from actively
requesting and obtaining credentials for an honest user. In brief, pre-authentication works by requiring the
client to include a timestamp encrypted with her long-term key (kC ) in the initial request. The authentication
server will only return credentials if the decrypted timestamp is sufﬁciently recent. This method successfully
prevents an attacker from actively obtaining ciphertext encrypted with the long-term key; however, it does
not prevent passive dictionary attacks, i.e., a passive attacker could eavesdrop on network communications,
record credentials as the honest client requests them, and attempt off-line dictionary decryption. Thus, pre-
authentication makes it slower for an attacker to perform cryptanalysis against the user’s long-term key, but
it does not fully prevent the vulnerability. One goal of PKINIT is to eliminate the possibility of this dictionary
attack.
2.2. Public-key Kerberos
PKINIT [25] is an extension toKerberos 5 that uses public-key cryptography to avoid shared secrets between
a client andKAS; itmodiﬁes theAS exchange but not other parts of the basicKerberos 5 protocol.Aswe just saw,
the long-term shared key (kC ) in the traditional AS exchange is typically derived from a password, which limits
the strength of the authentication to the user’s ability to choose and remember good passwords; PKINIT does
not use kC and thus avoids this problem. Furthermore, PKINIT allows network administrators to use an existing
public-key infrastructure (PKI) rather than expend additional effort tomanage users’ long-term keys needed for
traditional Kerberos. This protocol extension adds complexity to Kerberos as it retains symmetric encryption
in the later rounds but relies on asymmetric encryption, digital signatures, and corresponding certiﬁcates in the
ﬁrst round.
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Fig. 3. Message Flow in PKINIT-26 , where TGT = {AK ,C , tK }kT .
In PKINIT, the client C and the KAS possess independent public/secret key pairs, (pkC , skC) and (pkK , skK),
respectively. Certiﬁcate setsCertC andCertK issuedby aPKI independent fromKerberos are used to testify of the
binding between each principal and her purported public key. This simpliﬁes administration as authentication
decisions can now bemade based on the trust the KDC holds in just a few known certiﬁcation authorities within
the PKI, rather than keys individually shared with each client (local policies can, however, still be installed
for user-by-user authentication). Dictionary attacks are defeated as user-chosen passwords are replaced with
automatically generated asymmetric keys. The loginprocess changes as very fewuserswouldbe able to remember
a random public/secret key pair. In Microsoft Windows, keys and certiﬁcate chains are stored in a smartcard
that the user swipes in a reader at login time. A passphrase is generally required as an additional security
measure [28]. Other possibilities include keeping these credentials on the user’s hard drive, again protected by a
passphrase.
The manner in which PKINIT works depends on both the protocol version and the mode invoked. As the
PKINIT extension toKerberos has recently been published asRFC 4556 after a sequence of InternetDrafts [25],
we use “PKINIT-n” to refer to the protocol as speciﬁed in the nth draft revision and “PKINIT” for the protocol
more generally. These various drafts and the RFC can be found at [25]. We discovered the attack described
in Section 3 when studying PKINIT-25; our description of the vulnerable protocol is based on PKINIT-26,
which does not differ from PKINIT-25 in ways that affect the attack. In response to our work described here,
PKINIT-27 included a defense against our attack; we discuss this ﬁx in Section 4. The version of the protocol
deﬁned in RFC 4556 does not differ from the parts of PKINIT-27 that we discuss here.
PKINIT can operate in two modes. In public-key encryption mode, the key pairs (pkC , skC) and (pkK , skK) are
used for both signature and encryption. The latter is designed to (indirectly) protect the conﬁdentiality of AK ,
while the former ensures its integrity. In Difﬁe–Hellman (DH) mode, the key pairs are used to provide digital
signature support for an authenticated Difﬁe–Hellman key agreement which is used to protect the fresh key
AK shared between the client and KAS. A variant of this mode allows the reuse of previously generated shared
secrets. We will not discuss the DH mode in detail as our preliminary investigation did not reveal any ﬂaw in
it; we are currently working on a complete analysis of this mode. Furthermore, it appears not to have yet been
included in any of the major operating systems. The only support we are aware of is within the PacketCable
system [29], developed by CableLabs, a cable television research consortium.
Figure 3 illustrates the AS exchange in public-key encryption mode as of PKINIT-26. The differences with
respect to the traditional AS exchange (see Fig. 2) have been highlighted using boxes . In discussing this and
other descriptions of the protocol, we write [m]sk for the digital signature of message m with secret key sk .
(PKINIT realizes digital signatures by concatenating the message and a keyed hash for it, occasionally with
other data in between.) In our analysis of PKINIT in Section 6, we make the standard assumption that digital
signatures are unforgeable [30]. The encryption of m with public key pk is denoted {{m}}pk . As before, we write
{m}k for the encryption of m with symmetric key k .
The ﬁrst line of Fig. 3 describes the relevant parts of the request that a client C sends to a KAS K using
PKINIT-26. The last part of the message—C , T , n1—is exactly as in basic Kerberos 5, containing the client’s
name, the name of the TGS for which she wants a TGT, and a nonce. The boxed parts added by PKINIT include
the client’s certiﬁcates CertC and her signature (with her secret key skC ) over a timestamp tC and another nonce
n2. (The nonces and timestamp to the left of this line indicate that these are generated by C speciﬁcally for this
request, with the box indicating data not included in our abstract formalization of basic Kerberos 5 [7,8].) This
effectively implements a form of pre-authentication.
The second line in Fig. 3 shows our formalization of K ’s response, which is more complex than in basic
Kerberos. The last part of the message—C , TGT , {AK , n1, tK , T }
k
—is very similar to K ’s reply in basic Kerberos;
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Fig. 4. Message ﬂow in basic Kerberos.
the difference (boxed ) is that the symmetric key k protecting AK is now freshly generated by K and not a
long-term shared key. The ticket-granting-ticket TGT and the message encrypted under k are as in traditional
Kerberos. Because k is freshly generated for the reply, it must be communicated to C before she can learn AK .
PKINIT does this by adding the message {{CertK , [k , n2]skK }}pkC . This containsK ’s certiﬁcates and his signature,
using his secret key skK , over k and the nonce n2 from C’s request; all of this is encrypted under C’s public key
pkC .
This abstract description leaves out a number of ﬁeldswhich are of no signiﬁcancewith respect to the reported
attack or its ﬁx. We invite the interested reader to consult the speciﬁcations [25]. Also, recall that PKINIT leaves
the subsequent exchanges of Kerberos unchanged.
2.3. Message ﬂow in later exchanges
For the sake of completeness, we give a brief overview of the message structure in the remaining rounds
of Kerberos; Section 3.3 discusses how the attack on PKINIT can be propagated through these later rounds.
Figure 4 updates Fig. 1 to show the details of the messages in basic Kerberos. PKINIT modiﬁes the ﬁrst two of
these messages as illustrated in Fig. 3.
The AS exchange (either traditional or with PKINIT) provides the client with an authentication key AK and
a ticket-granting-ticket TGT = {AK ,C , tK }kT .
In the TG exchange,C then requests an ST from T after generating a new nonce n3 and timestamp; her request
includes the TGT (which she cannot read but simply forwards from K), an authenticator {C , tC}AK containing
her name and timestamp and encrypted with AK , the name of the server S for which she wants an ST, and the
new nonce. T ’s response has the same structure as K ’s, but now with an ST in place of the TGT and S taking
the role of T in the rest of the message.
Finally, in the CS exchange, C authenticates herself to S by sending the ST and an authenticator {C , t′C}SK
containing her name and timestamp, and encrypted under the fresh key SK . S may authenticate himself back
to C by encrypting C’s timestamp (but not C’s name, so that the result differs from the authenticator) with SK
and returning this message to C .
3. The attack
In this section, we report on a dangerous attack against PKINIT in public-key encryption mode. We discov-
ered this attack as we were interpreting the speciﬁcation documents of this protocol [25] in preparation for its
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Fig. 5. Message ﬂow in the man-in-the-middle attack on PKINIT-26, where TGT = {AK , I, tK }kT .
formalization in MSR [9,31,32], the speciﬁcation language for our analysis. We start with a detailed description
of the attacker’s actions in the AS exchange, the key to the attack. We then review the conditions required for
the attack and close this section with a discussion of how the attacker may propagate the effects of her AS
exchange actions throughout the rest of a protocol run.
3.1. Message ﬂow
Figure 5 shows the AS exchange message ﬂow in the attack. The client C sends a request to the KAS K
which is intercepted by the attacker I , who constructs his own request message using the parameters from C’s
message. All data signed by C are sent unencrypted—indeed [msg]sk can be understood as an abbreviation for
the plaintext msg together with a keyed hash of the message—so that I may generate his own signatures over
data from C’s request. The result is a well-formed request message from I , although constructed using some
data originating with C . I ’s changes to the request message are boxed above the top-right arrow of Fig. 5. (We
have omitted an unkeyed checksum taken over unencrypted data from these messages; I can regenerate this as
needed to produce a valid request.)
I forwards the fabricated request to the KAS K , who views it as a valid request for credentials if I is himself
a legitimate client; there is nothing to indicate that some of the data originated with C . K responds with a reply
containing credentials for I (the bottom-right arrow in Fig. 5). The TGT has the form {AK , I , tK }kT ; note that,
because it is encrypted with the key kT shared between K and the TGS T , it is opaque to C (and I ). Another
part of the reply is encrypted using the public key of the client for whom the credentials are generated, in this
case I . This allows the attacker to decrypt this part of the message using his private key, learn the key k , and
use this to learn the key AK . An honest client would only use this information to send a request message to the
TGS T . Instead, I uses C’s public key to re-encrypt the data he decrypted using his private key (having learned
pkC , if necessary, from CertC in the original request), replaces his name with C’s, and forwards the result to C .
To C this message appears to be a valid reply from K generated in response to C’s initial request (recall that C
cannot read I ’s name inside the TGT).
At this point, C believes she has authenticated herself to the KAS and that the credentials she has obtained—
the keyAK and the accompanying TGT—were generated for her. However, theKAShas completed the PKINIT
exchange with I and has generated AK and the TGT for I . The attacker knows the key AK (as well as k ,
which is not used other than to encrypt AK) and can therefore decrypt any message that C would protect with
it.
Protocol-level attacks in the same vein of the vulnerability we uncovered have been reported in the literature
for other protocols. In 1992,Difﬁe, vanOorschot, andWiener noted that a signature-based variant of the Station-
to-Station protocol [33] could be defeated by a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack which bears similarities to
what we observed in the ﬁrst half of our vulnerability; in 2003 Canetti and Krawczyk [34] observed that the
“basic authenticated Difﬁe–Hellman” mode of the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE) [35] had this very
same vulnerability. In 1996, Lowe [36] found an attack on the Needham–Schroeder public-key protocol [37] that
manipulates public-key encryption essentially in the same way as what happens in the second half of our attack.
Because it alters both signatures and asymmetric encryptions, our attack against PKINIT stems from both
[36,33]. In 1995, Clark and Jacob [38] discovered a similar ﬂaw on Hwang and Chen’s corrected SPLICE/AS
protocol [39].
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Fig. 6. Message ﬂow in the man-in-the-middle attack on PKINIT-26, after the messages in Fig. 5, when the attacker forwards and observes
trafﬁc; here TGT = {AK , I , tK }kT and ST = {SK , I, tT }kS .
3.2. Assumptions
In order for this attack to work, the attacker must be a legal Kerberos client so that the KAS will grant him
credentials. In particular, he must possess a public/secret key pair (pkI, skI) and valid certiﬁcates CertI trusted
by the KAS. The attacker must also be able to intercept messages, which is a standard assumption. Finally,
PKINIT must be used in public-key encryption mode, which is commonly done as the alternative DH mode
does not appear to be readily available, except for domain speciﬁc systems [28,29].
3.3. Effects of the attack
Attacker observes trafﬁc. Once the attacker learnsAK in theAS exchange, hemay eithermediateC’s interactions
with the various servers (essentially logging in as I while leaking data toC so she believes she has logged in) while
observing this trafﬁc or simply impersonate the servers in the later exchanges. In the ﬁrst variant, which is shown
inFig. 6, onceC hasAK and aTGT, shewould normally contact theTGS to get an ST for some application server
S . This request contains an authenticator of the form {C , tC ,T }AK (i.e., C’s name and a timestamp, encrypted with
AK). Because I knows AK , he may intercept the request and replace the authenticator with one that refers to
himself: {I , tI ,T }AK . The reply from the TGS contains a freshly generated key SK ; this is encrypted under AK , for
C to read and thus accessible to I , and also included in an ST that is opaque to all but the TGS and application
server. I may intercept this message and learn SK , replace an instance of his name with C’s name, and forward
the result to C . As I knows SK , he can carry out a similar MITM attack on the CS exchange, replacing the
authenticator {C , tC ,S}SK with the authenticator {I , tI ,S}SK and then replacing the server’s reply {tI ,S}SK with the
reply {tC ,S}SK that the client is expecting. This exchange ostensibly authenticates C to the application server;
however, because the service ticket names I , this server would believe that he is interacting with I , not C .
Attacker impersonates servers. Alternatively, the attackermay interceptC’s requests in theTGandCSexchanges
and impersonate the involved servers rather than forwarding altered messages to them; the message ﬂow for
this version of the attack is shown in Fig. 7. In the TG exchange, I will ignore the TGT and only decrypt the
portion of the request encrypted under AK (which he learned during the initial exchange). The attacker will then
generate a bogus service ticket XST , which the client expects to be opaque, and a fresh key SK encrypted (along
with other data n3, tT , S) under AK , and send these to C in what appears to be a properly formatted reply from
the TGS. In the CS exchange the attacker may again intercept the client’s request; in this case, no new keys
need to be generated, and the attacker only needs to return the client’s timestamp encrypted under SK—which
I himself generated in the previous exchange—for C to believe that she has completed this exchange with the
application server S . Note that the attackermay take the ﬁrst approach—mediating the exchange betweenC and
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Fig. 7. Message ﬂow in the man-in-the-middle attack on PKINIT-26, after the messages in Fig. 5, when the attacker impersonates the
TGS and end server; here TGT = {AK , I, tK }kT while XST is a garbage message.
a TGS—in the TG exchange and then the second—impersonating the application server—in the CS exchange.
The reverse is not possible because I cannot forge a valid ST for S when impersonating T .
Regardless of which approach the attacker uses to propagate the attack throughout the protocol run, C
ﬁnishes the CS exchange believing that she has interacted with a server S and that T has generated a fresh key
SK known only to C and S . Instead, I knows SK in addition to, or instead of, S (depending on how I propagated
the attack). Thus I may learn any data that C attempts to send to S; depending on the type of server involved,
such data could be quite sensitive. Note that this attack does not allow I to impersonate C to a TGS or an
application server because all involved tickets name I ; Section 6.4 discusses a related authentication property.
This also means that if C is in communication with an actual server (T or S), that server will view the client as
I , not C .
4. Preventing the attack
The attack outlined in the previous section was possible because the two messages constituting the then-
current version of PKINIT were insufﬁciently bound to each other. More precisely, the attack shows that,
although a client can link a received response to a previous request (thanks to the nonces n1 and n2, and to
the timestamp tC ), she cannot be sure that the KAS generated the key AK and the ticket-granting-ticket TGT
appearing in this response for her. Indeed, the only evidence of the principal for whom the KAS generated these
credentials appears inside the TGT, which is opaque to her. This suggests one approach to making PKINIT
immune to this attack, namely to require the KAS to include the identity of this principal in a component of
the response that is integrity-protected and that the client can verify. An obvious mechanism is the submessage
signed by the KAS in the reply.
Following a methodology we successfully applied in previous work on Kerberos [7,9], we have constructed
a formal model of both PKINIT-26 and various possible ﬁxes to this protocol (including the one adopted in
PKINIT-27). Details can be found in Section 6. Property 4.1 informally states that PKINIT-27 and subsequent
versions satisfy a security property that we see violated in PKINIT-26, demonstrating that this ﬁx does indeed
defend against our attack.
Property 4.1. In PKINIT-27 (and subsequent versions), whenever a client C processes an AS reply containing
server-generated public-key credentials, the KAS previously produced such credentials for C.
This property informally expresses the contents of Corollary 6.4, which we prove in Section 6.
As we worked on our formal analysis, we solicited feedback from the IETFKerberosWorkingGroup, and in
particular the authors of the PKINIT speciﬁcations, about possible ﬁxes we were considering. We also analyzed
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Fig. 8. Abstract ﬁx of PKINIT.
Fig. 9. Fix of PKINIT adopted in version 27.
the ﬁx, proposed by the Working Group, that was included in PKINIT-27 and subsequent revisions of this
speciﬁcation [25].
4.1. Abstract ﬁx
Having traced the origin of the discovered attack to the fact that the client cannot verify that the received
credentials (theTGTand the keyAK) were generated for her, the problem canbe ﬁxed by having theKAS include
C’s name in the reply in such a way that it cannot be modiﬁed en route and that C can check it. Following well-
established recommendations [40], we initially proposed a simple and minimally intrusive approach to doing
so: including C’s name in the portion of the reply signed by the KAS (in PKINIT-26, this is [k , n2]skK ). We then
generalized it by observing that the KAS can sign k and any message fragment F(C , ni) that is suitably built
from C’s name and at least one of the nonces n1 and n2 from C’s request for credentials. With this abstract ﬁx
in place, the PKINIT exchange in public-key encryption mode is depicted in Fig. 8, where we have used a box
to highlight the modiﬁcation with respect to PKINIT-26. Here F represents any construction that injectively
involves C and either n1 or n2—i.e., F(C , ni) = F(C ′, n′i) implies C = C ′ and ni = n′i—and is veriﬁable by the
client. Integrity protection is guaranteed by the fact that it appears inside a component signed by the KAS, and
therefore is non-malleable by the attacker (assuming that the KAS’s signature keys are secure). Intuitively, this
defends against the attack since the client C can now verify that the KAS generated the received credentials for
her and not for another principal (such as I in our attack). Indeed, an honest KAS will produce the signature
([k , F(C , ni)]skK ) only in response to a request from C . The presence of the nonces n1 or n2 uniquely identiﬁes
which of the (possibly several) requests fromC to which this reply corresponds. Note that the fact that we do not
need F to mention both n1 and n2 entails that the nonce n2 is superﬂuous as far as authentication is concerned.
We will formally prove that this variant defends against the attack in Section 6.
A simple instance of this general schema consists in taking F(C , ni) to be (C , n2), yielding the signed data
[k ,C , n2]skK , which corresponds to simply including C’s name within the signed portion of the PKINIT-26 reply.
This version is very similar to the initial target of our formal veriﬁcation. We showed that indeed it defeats
the reported attack and satisﬁed the formal authentication property violated in PKINIT-26. Only later did we
generalize the proof to refer to the abstract construction F . Its correctness will follow as a simple corollary of
the validity of our general schema, as we will show in Section 6.
4.2. Solution adopted in PKINIT-27
When we discussed our initial ﬁx with the authors of the PKINIT document, we received the request to apply
our methodology to verify a different solution: rather than simply including C’s name in the signed portion of
the reply, replace the nonce n2 there with a keyed hash (“checksum” in Kerberos terminology) taken over the
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client’s entire request. We did so and showed that this approach also defeats our attack. It is on the basis of this
ﬁnding that we distilled the general ﬁx discussed above, of which both solutions are instances.
The IETF Kerberos Working Group later decided to include the checksum-based approach in PKINIT-27
and its subsequent revisions [25]. The message ﬂow of this version of PKINIT is displayed in Fig. 9. Here, ck
is a checksum of the client’s request keyed with the key k , i.e., ck has the form Hk(CertC , [tC , n2]skC ,C , T , n1)
where H is a preimage-resistant MAC function. This means that it is computationally infeasible for the at-
tacker to ﬁnd a message whose checksum matches that of a given message. Following the speciﬁcations
in [41], which discusses cryptographic algorithms for use in the Kerberos protocol suite, current candidates
for H include hmac-sha1-96-aes128. New strong keyed checksums can be used for ck as they are devel-
oped.
5. Formalizing PKINIT in MSR
We have formalized PKINIT in the language MSR [9,31,32] and used this speciﬁcation to verify the cor-
rectness of the proposed ﬁxes. MSR is a ﬂexible framework for specifying complex cryptographic protocols,
possibly structured as a collection of coordinated subprotocols. It uses strongly typed multiset rewriting rules
over ﬁrst-order atomic formulas to express protocol actions and relies on a form of existential quantiﬁcation to
symbolically model the generation of fresh data (e.g., nonces or short-term keys).
5.1. Terms and types
MSR represents network messages and their components as ﬁrst-order terms. Thus the TGT {AK ,C , tK }kT
sent from K to C is modeled as the term obtained by applying the binary encryption symbol {_}_ to the
constant kT and the subterm (AK ,C , tK ). This subterm is built using atomic terms and two applications of
the binary concatenation symbol (“_, _”). For simplicity, we retain the semi-formal message syntax used ear-
lier. Terms are classiﬁed by types, which describe their intended meaning and restrict the set of terms that
can be legally constructed. For example, {_}_ accepts a key (type key) and a message (type msg), produc-
ing a term of type msg; using a nonce as the key yields an ill-formed term. Nonces, principal names, etc.,
often appear within messages; MSR uses the subsort relation to facilitate this. For example, deﬁning nonce
to be a subsort of msg (written nonce <: msg) allows nonces to be treated as messages. Both term con-
structors and types are deﬁnable. This allows us to formalize the specialized principals of Kerberos 5 as
subsorts of the generic principal type: we introduce types client, KAS, TGS and server, with the obvious
meanings.
MSR supports more structured type deﬁnitions [31]. Dependent types allow capturing the binding between
a key and the principals for whom it was created. For example, the fact that a short-term key k is intended to
be shared between a particular client C and server S is expressed by declaring it to be of type shK C S . Because
k is a key, shK C S is a subsort of key (for all C and S), and since k is short term this type is also a subsort
of msg as k needs to be transmitted in a message. We similarly model the long-term keys that a principal A
shares with the KAS as objects of type dbK A, which is again a subsort of key but not of msg; these keys are
not intended to be sent over the network, and this typing prohibits this. Dependent types give us elegant means
to describe the public-key machinery. If (pk , sk) is the public/secret key pair of principal A, we simply declare
pk of type pubK A and sk of type secK pk . Secret keys, like the long-term keys, are not intended to be sent over
the messages; thus the type secK pk is a subsort of key but not of msg. Although we do not explicitly include
public keys in messages here, pubK A is a subsort of msg. The constructors for encryption and digital signature
are written {{m}}pk and [m]sk , respectively, as in the text so far.
Other types used in the formalization of PKINIT include time for timestamps, CertList for lists of digital
certiﬁcates, and someSecK as an auxiliary type for working with digital signatures. The use of someSecK
allows us, e.g., to model a signed message without declaring the public key or its owner that correspond to the
signing key; in order to verify the signature we use the predicate VerifySig together with a list of certiﬁcates (as
in Fig. 10) instead of a speciﬁc public key. We also use the constructor Hk(m) to model the checksum (keyed
hash) of message m keyed with symmetric key k .
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Fig. 10. KAS’s role in the abstract ﬁx version of the PKINIT AS exchange.
5.2. States, rules, and the formalization of PKINIT
The state of a protocol execution is determined by the network messages in transit, the local knowledge
of each principal, and other similar data. MSR formalizes individual bits of information in a state by means
of facts consisting of predicate name and one or more terms. For example, the network fact N({AK ,C , tK }kT )
indicates that the term {AK ,C , tK }kT , a TGT, is present on the network, and I({AK ,C , tK }kT ) that it is known by
the attacker.
A protocol consists of actions that transform the state. In MSR, this is modeled by the notion of rule: a
description of the facts that an action removes from the current state and the facts it replaces them with to
produce the next state. For example, Fig. 10 describes the actions of the KAS in the abstract ﬁx of PKINIT (see
Section 4) where F(C , ni) stands for a construction that contains C and either n1 or n2 (or both). Ignoring for the
moment the leading ∀K : KAS and the outermost brackets leaves us with a single MSR rule—labeled 2.1 above
the arrow—that we will use to illustrate characteristics of MSR rules in general.
Rules are parametric, as evidenced by the leading string of typed universal quantiﬁers: actual values need to
be supplied before applying the rule. Themiddle portion (· · · ⇒ · · ·) describes the transformation performed by
the rule: it replaces states containing a fact of the form N(CertC , [tC , n2]skC ,C , T , n1) with states that contain the
fact on its right-hand side but which are otherwise identical. The existential marker “∃AK : shK C T ” requires
AK to be replaced with a newly generated symbol of type shK C T , and similarly for “∃k : shK C K”; this is
how freshness requirements are modeled in MSR. The last line, starting with the keyword IF, further constrains
the applicability of the rule by requiring that certain predicates be present (differently from the left-hand side,
they are not removed as a result of applying the rule). Here, we use the predicates VerifySig to verify that a
digital signature is valid given a list of credentials (VerifySig(s;m; P ,Certs) holds if s is the signature, relative
to certiﬁcates Certs, by principal P over the message m). Additionally, we use ValidK to capture the local policy
of K in issuing tickets, and ClockK to model the local clock of K . While the entities following ‘IF’ are logically
facts, in practice they are often handled procedurally, outside of MSR.
Rule 2.1 completely describes the behavior of the KAS; in general, multiple rules may be needed, as when
modeling the actions of the client in the AS exchange. Coordinated rules describing the behavior of a principal
are collected in a role. A role is just a sequence of rules, parameterized by the principal executing them (their
owner)—the “∀K : KAS” above the brackets in Fig. 10. The two-rule role describing the client’s actions of the
abstract ﬁx version of PKINIT is displayed in Fig. 11. Formalizations of the TG and CS exchanges can be found
in Appendix 7, with detailed explanations in [7,9,42].
5.3. Execution semantics
Going into more detail, the execution semantics of MSR operates by transforming not states (as introduced
in the previous section) but conﬁgurations of the form 〈S〉R, where S is a state, the signature  contains the
symbols being used (with their type), and the active role set R = ( rhoa11 , . . . , ann ) records the remaining actions
of the currently present roles (i) together with the principals executing them (ai).
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Fig. 11. Client’s role in the abstract ﬁx version of the PKINIT AS exchange.
Basic execution steps are expressed by judgments of the form P 
 C −→ C ′ where P is the protocol speci-
ﬁcation, and C and C ′ are consecutive conﬁgurations. These judgments are deﬁned by the following two rules
(which are somewhat simpliﬁed from [43]):
(P , ) 
 〈S〉R −→ 〈S〉R,
a

inst
P 
 〈S , []lhs〉R,((lhs⇒∃x.rhs),)a −→ 〈S , [, c/x]rhs〉R,
a
,c
rw
The rule inst prepares a role for execution by inserting it in the active role set: it associates the role with
the principal a that will be executing it. The same role can be loaded arbitrarily many times by any principal
(subject to some typing limitations), which provides support for the concurrent execution of multiple sessions
and therefore also for multi-session attacks. The inference rw describes the application of a state transforming
rule r = lhs ⇒ rhs introduced in the previous section: if an instance []lhs of its left-hand side appears in the
state, it is replaced by the corresponding instantiation of the right-hand side of r after instantiating the existential
variables x with new constants c. The rule r is then removed from the active role set of the conﬁguration, and c
is added to the signature.
In order to present rule application in a compact yet precise way, the notion of an abstract execution step
is used which denotes a quadruple C r,−→C ′. Here, C and C ′ are consecutive conﬁgurations, r identiﬁes the rule
from P being executed, and  stands for the overall substitution [, c/x] above. We say that r is applicable in C
if there exist a substitution  and a conﬁguration C ′ such that C r,−→C ′ is deﬁned.
A trace T is then a sequence of the form
C0
r1,1−→ C1
r2,2−→ · · · rn,n−→ Cn+1
where C0 = 〈S0〉R00 is called the initial conﬁguration of T . In the context of Kerberos, the state component S0
of the initial conﬁguration contains only the predicates used in constraints (e.g., VerifySig in Fig. 11), and the
intruder’s knowledge (see next section); in particular, no network message or memory predicate is contained in
S0. The initial signature0 withinC0 contains the names of all principals together with their types (client, server,
KAS, etc.), and their keys, etc.The initial active role setR0 withinC0 is empty. Note that we only need to consider
ﬁnite traces, because execution (in any networked computer system) proceeds by discrete steps and started at
a speciﬁc moment in time. Likewise, a generic trace will contain only a ﬁnite, although a priori unbounded,
number of applications of inference inst for the same role .
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5.4. Intruder model
The intruder model in our analysis of public-key Kerberos is a variant of the classic Dolev–Yao intruder
model [37,44]. The attacker in this model can traditionally intercept and originate network trafﬁc, encrypt and
decrypt captured messages as long as he knows the correct key, concatenate and split messages at will, generate
certain types of messages (e.g., keys and nonces) but not others (e.g., principals), and access public data such as
principal names.
This set of intruder capabilities is given a precise speciﬁcation in MSR. For this purpose, the knowledge of
the intruder is modeled as a collection of facts I(m) (“the intruder knows message m”) distributed in the state.
The intruder himself is represented as the distinguished principal I bymeans of the declaration I : principal. Each
capability is expressed by means of a one-rule role that can be executed only by I. For example, the speciﬁcations
of network message interception, message splitting and nonce generation have the following form:
I[∀m : msg
N(m) INT⇒ I(m)
] I[∀m1,m2 : msg
I(m1),
I(m2)
CPM⇒ I(m1,m2)
] I[
· NG⇒ ∃n : nonce
I(n)
]
Notice that these roles identify Ias their owner (above the left brace) rather thanageneric principal (introduced
by a universal quantiﬁer in the previous section).
Because public-key Kerberos relies on more than shared keys, we extend our earlier intruder formalization
with the following rules for public-key encryption and decryption. These allow the intruder to learn any public-
key of any principal P , or to learn any of his own secret keys (but not those of other principals), and then to
encrypt and decrypt if the proper keys are known.
I[∀P : principal ∀pk : pubK P
.
PK ′⇒ I(pk)
] I[∀pk : pubK I ∀sk : secK sk
.
SK ′⇒ I(sk)
]
I⎡
⎣∀P : principal ∀pk : pubK P∀m : msg
I(m), I(pk) PEC
′⇒ I({{m}}pk)
⎤
⎦
I⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∀P : principal ∀pk : pubK P
∀sk : secK pk ∀m : msg
I({{m}}pk), I(sk) PDEC
′⇒ I(m)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Signing is handled similarly as shown in rule SIG below. Rather than having the intruder verify signatures, an
activity an attacker will rarely bother with (although it could easily be modeled in MSR), rule PEEK allows
him to extract a message from a signature. It should be noted that this speciﬁcation deemphasizes the PKI
infrastructure on which PKINIT relies as it conﬁnes the use of certiﬁcates to the predicate VerifySig. A more
explicit treatment is unnecessary in this case.
I⎡
⎣∀P : principal ∀pk : pubK P∀sk : secK pk ∀m : msg
I(m), I(sk) SIG⇒ I([m]sk )
⎤
⎦
I[∀sk : someSecK ∀m : msg
I([m]sk ) PEEK⇒ I(m)
]
Because secret keys are typed like long-term keys, we add speciﬁc rules allowing duplication and deletion in
memory of known secret keys (paralleling the rules DPD and DLD from [42]). These are straightforward, and
we omit the speciﬁc rules here.
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Fig. 12. The deﬁnition of k (m;m0), the k-rank of m relative to m0.
The remaining rules implementing the other traditionalDolev–Yao intruder capabilities are deﬁned similarly.
A complete list for basic Kerberos can be found in [42].
6. Formal analysis of PKINIT
Our formal proofs rely on a double induction aimed at separating the conﬁdentiality and authentication
aspects of the analysis of Kerberos 5. Conﬁdentiality and authentication can interact in complex ways,
requiring both types of functions in a single proof. (This is not so much the case in the AS exchange,
because the security of this ﬁrst exchange does not rely on properties of earlier rounds, but it is seen
clearly in the later rounds as illustrated in [7,42].) Our proofs are supported by two classes of functions,
rank and corank, whose deﬁnitions we recall in Section 6.1. We prove the correctness of the ﬁxed protocol
in Section 6.2, discuss other authentication properties in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, and then state and prove
auxiliary lemmas in Section 6.5.
6.1. Rank and corank
We start by reviewing the deﬁnition of rank and corank functions as originally given in [7,8,42] and extended
to include the cryptographic primitives that PKINIT adds to basic Kerberos. We start by deﬁning these classes
of functions inductively on terms and then extend the deﬁnitions to facts.
Rank. Rank captures the amount of work done using a speciﬁc key to encrypt a speciﬁed message. For a
cryptographic key k and a ﬁxed message m0, we deﬁne the k-rank of a message m relative to m0 as shown in Fig.
12.
If m is an atomic term, then no work has been done using k , and we set the rank to 0. If m is exactly {m0}k ,{{m0}}k , or [m0]k , then we set the rank to 1. Encrypting or signing a message m of positive k-rank will increase
the rank by 1 in case one uses the key k , whereas using a key k ′ /= k will have no effect on the k-rank ofm relative
to m0. The rank of the concatenation of two messages is set to be the larger of the ranks of the constituent
messages.
The extension of the rank function to facts is straightforward. For a key k and for m0 of type msg, and
terms t, ti , and P any predicate in the protocol signature, we deﬁne the k-rank of a fact P(t1, ..., tj) relative to m0
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Fig. 13. Deﬁnition of ˆE(m;m0), the E-corank of m relative to m0.
by k(P(t1, ..., tj);m0) = max1ijk(ti;m0). E.g., for network facts the k-rank relative to m0 is k(N(m);m0) =
k(m;m0).
Our rank functions are most closely connected to data origin authentication, although they are used in
conjunctionwith corank functions inmany proofs [8]. The relationship between rank and authentication follows
Theorem 6.1, which was outlined in [8].
Theorem 6.1. If k(F ;m0) = 0 for every fact F in the initial state of a generic trace T and if no intruder rule can
increase the k-rank relative to m0 then the existence of a fact F with k(F ;m0) > 0 in some non-initial state of T
implies that some honest principal ﬁred a rule which produced a fact build up from {m0}k .
As in [42] (although stated there without some of the primitives needed to model PKINIT), if an intruder rule
increases k-rank relative to m0, then the left-hand side of that rule contains I(k). Thus, if we show that I(k) never
appears in a trace, we may invoke Theorem 6.1 to help prove authentication.
Corank. Corank captures the minimum effort needed, using keys from a speciﬁed set, to extract a (possibly)
secret message from a given term. For a set E of keys, none of which is a public key, and a ﬁxed atomic message
m0, we deﬁne the E-corank of message m relative to m0 as shown in Fig. 13. If m is atomic and m = m0, then no
work using keys from E is needed to obtain m0, and we set the corank to 0. If m is atomic and m /= m0, then no
amount of such work can extractm0. The number of decryptions needed to obtainm0 from {m}k using keys from
E is 1 more than or the same as the number of decryptions needed to obtain m0 from m, depending on whether
k (if the encryption is symmetric) or some k ′ : secK k (if the encryption is asymmetric) is an element of E or
not. The corank of the concatenation of two messages is equal to the smaller of the coranks of the constituent
messages.
The extension of the corank function to facts is slightly different from that of the rank function. The deﬁnition
of corank of a fact depends on the predicate P in which it occurs. For example, for the network predicate N()
we deﬁne ˆE(N(m);m0) = ˆE(m;m0), while for the client’s memory predicate AuthC (used in the rules in Figs. 11,
A.1, and A.3) we deﬁne ˆE(AuthC(t1, t2, t3);m0) = ˆE(t1;m0). This follows our informal rule [7,8] that the corank
of a fact depends only on the arguments of the predicate that might be put onto the network.
Our corank functions are closely connected to conﬁdentiality, which we typically prove by invoking the
following theorem from [8].
Theorem 6.2. If ˆE(F ;m0) > 0 for every fact in the initial state of a generic trace T , if no intruder can decrease the
E-corank relative tom0, and if no honest principal creates a fact F with ˆE(F ;m0) = 0, thenm0 is secret throughout
T .
6.2. Correctness of the ﬁx
We now present the theorem that establishes the correctness of the abstract ﬁx to PKINIT introduced in
Section 4.1. This, in turn, implies the correctness of PKINIT-27 and subsequent versions of PKINIT (including
the ﬁnal speciﬁcation)—i.e., that Property 4.1 holds—because these use a special case of the abstract ﬁx. In
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the following we will assume that F(C , ni) = F(C ′, n′i) implies C = C ′ and ni = n′i , for any C ,C ′ : client and
ni , n′i : nonce (for i = 1, 2).
Theorem 6.3. If
(1) the fact N({{CertK , [k , F(C , ni)]skK }}pkC ,C ,X , {AK , n1, tK , T }k) appears in a trace, for some C : client, K :
KAS, k : shK C K , skK : someSecK, X : msg, CertK : CertList, pkC : pubK C , T : TGS, AK : shK C T ,
ni , n1 : nonce, and tK : time;
(2) the fact VerifySig([k , F(C , ni)]skK ; (k , F(C , ni));K ,CertK) holds; and
(3) for every pkK : pubK K and sk : secK pkK , the fact I(sk) does not appear in the trace and no fact in the
initial state of the trace contained a fact of positive sk-rank relative to (k , F(C , ni)),
then
the KAS K ﬁred rule 2.1, consuming the fact N(CertC , [tC , n2]skC ,C , T , n1) and creating the fact N({{CertK ,[k , F(C , ni)]skK }}pkC ,C , {AK ,C , tK }kT , {AK , n1, tK , T }k), for someCertC : CertList, skC : secK pkC ,n2 : nonce,
tC , tK : time, kT : dbK T.
Proof.BecauseVerifySig([k , F(C , ni)]skK ; (k , F(C , ni));K ,CertK)holds, byLemma6.10 there is some sk : secK pkK
such thatsk([k , F(C , ni)]skK ; (k , F(C , ni))) > 0 (wherepkK : pubK K).Thus the factN({{CertC , [k , F(C , ni)]skK}}pkC ,
C ,X , {AK , n1, tK , T }k) has positive sk-rank relative to (k , F(C , ni)); by hypothesis, no such fact existed in the initial
state of the trace, so some rule ﬁring during the trace must have increased this rank.
By hypothesis, I(sk) does not appear in the initial state of the trace, so by Lemma 6.14 I(sk) does not ap-
pear in any state of the trace. By Lemma 6.11, this means that no rule ﬁred by the intruder can increase sk-
rank relative to (k , F(C , ni)); thus, by Theorem 6.1, at some point in this trace an honest principal must have
ﬁred a rule that increased this rank. By inspection of the principal rules, the only one that can do this is rule
2.1; in order for this rule to do so, it must be ﬁred by the KAS K who owns sk , consume a network fact
N(CertC ′ , [t, n′2]skC′ ,C
′, T ′, n′1) for some t : time, n′2, n′1 : nonce, CertC ′ : CertList, C ′ : client, and T ′ : TGS, and
produce the fact N({{CertK , [k , F(C ′, n′i)]sk}}pkC′ , C ′, {AK ′,C ′, t′K }kT ′ , {AK ′, n′1, t′K , T ′}k) for some CertK : CertList,
sk : someSecK, pkC ′ : pubK C ′, AK ′ : shK C ′ T ′, t′K : time, kT ′ : dbK T ′, n′1 : nonce, and F(C ′, n′i) = F(C , ni). By
assumption, (C ′, n′i) = (C , ni), which implies that the request that K processed must match the request described
in the hypotheses. 
The following corollary specializes the result in Theorem 6.3 to the particular ﬁx used in PKINIT-27 and to
the client’s receipt of the network message described in the hypotheses of this theorem. It is the formal statement
of Property 4.1, which says that if C processes a reply message (containing the signed checksum of a request that
C previously sent), then some KAS K must have sent a reply message intended for C .
Corollary 6.4. If
(1) Some C : client ﬁres rule 1.2, consuming the fact N({{CertK , [k , ck]skK}}pkC ,C ,X , {AK , n1, tK , T }k) and produc-
ing the fact AuthC(X , T ,AK) for some
K : KAS, k : shK C K , skK : someSecK, ck ,X : msg, CertK : CertList, pkC : pubK C , T : TGS,
AK : shK C T , n1 : nonce, tK : time, and
(2) ck = Hk(CertC , [tC , n2]skC ,C , T , n1), for some tC : time, n2 : nonce, CertC : CertList, skC : SecK pkC , and
(3) for every pkK : pubK K and sk : secK pkK , the fact I(sk) does not appear in the trace and no fact in the initial
state of the trace contained a fact of positive sk-rank relative to (k , ck),
then
the KAS K ﬁred rule 2.1, consuming the fact N(CertC , [tC , n2]skC ,C , T , n1) and creating the fact
N({{CertK , [k , ck]skK }}pkC ,C , {AK ,C , tK }kT , {AK , n1, tK , T }k), for some kT : dbK T , tK : time.
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Proof. This follows by letting F(C , ni) = ck = Hk(CertC , [tC , n2]skC ,C , T , n1) in Theorem 6.3; this construction
satisﬁes the assumptions on F(C , ni) for both i = 1 and i = 2. C’s rule ﬁring implies that the ﬁrst two hypotheses
of the theorem hold; the third hypothesis of the corollary specializes the third hypothesis of the theorem to the
case of ck = F(C , ni), which implies the conclusion for some n′1, n′2 : nonce andCert′C : CertList.C’s ﬁring of rule
1.2 (when specialized to the checksum) implies that the n′1 = n1, n′2 = n2, and Cert′C = CertC . 
As a further remark, if in the abstract ﬁx of PKINIT from Section 4.1 one chooses F(C , ni) = F(C , n1), the
proof of Theorem 6.3 shows that authentication of the KAS to the client still holds. In fact, the KAS does not
return any information containing n2. This means that the following holds.
Property 6.5. The signed nonce n2 in the client’s AS request is superﬂuous for the purpose of authentication in
PKINIT.
This property does not imply that n2 can simply be omitted from the ﬁrst message of PKINIT in general, as
some signed session identiﬁers is necessary to correctly support authentication as in Property 6.6 below. Rather,
it suggests that it could be simpliﬁed by replacing every occurrence of n2 with n1.
6.3. Authentication of C to K
While our primary focus here is on the authentication of K to C , because C signs a nonce in her request we
may also prove authentication of C to K ; note that this holds in both the broken and ﬁxed versions of PKINIT,
as the ﬁx does not affectC’s request or our reasoning about it. Informally, we state this as the following property.
Property 6.6. If a KAS processes a PKINIT request from a client C , then previously C sent a PKINIT request that
contained the signed data in the message received and processed by the KAS.
Formally, we state this property as the following theorem.
Theorem 6.7. If
(1) Some K : KAS ﬁres rule 2.1, consuming the fact N(CertC , [tC , n2]sk ,C , T , n1) for some CertC : CertList, tC :
time, n1, n2 : nonce, sk : someSecK, C : client, and T : TGS; and
(2) for every pk : pubK C and sk : secK pk , the fact I(sk) does not appear in the trace and no fact in the initial
state of the trace contained a fact of positive sk-rank relative to (tC , n2),
then
at somepoint earlier in the trace, the clientC ﬁred rule 1.1, generating the factN(tC , n2,Cert′C , [tC , n2]skC ,C , T ′, n′1)
for some Cert′C : CertList, T ′ : TGS, and n′1 : nonce.
Proof.Having assumed thatK ﬁred rule 2.1, the fact VerifySig([tC , n2]sk; (tC , n2);C ,CertC)must hold. ByLemma
6.10, the fact consumed by this rule ﬁring has positive sk-rank relative to (tC , n2). By hypothesis, no such fact
appeared in the initial state of the trace, so some rule that was ﬁred during the trace increased this rank. Also
by hypothesis, I(sk) cannot appear in the trace, so by Lemma 6.11, the intruder cannot increase this rank. By
inspection of the principal rules, the only rule that can increase this rank is rule 1.1 when ﬁred by C to create the
fact N(tC , n2,Cert′C , [tC , n2]skC ,C , T ′, n′1) for some Cert′C : CertList, T ′ : TGS, and n′1 : nonce. 
6.4. Authentication in the pre-ﬁx protocol
Our attack in Section 3 showed that an intruder could impersonate a KAS to a client. This means that
KAS-to-client authentication does not hold when PKINIT-26 is used, in the sense that a client might receive
a reply containing her name that appears to come from some KAS but without any KAS having ever sent
such a message. However, PKINIT-26 does provide some authentication with respect to the later exchanges
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as shown by Property 6.8 below, and this property still holds in the ﬁxed protocol (PKINIT-27 and later ver-
sions).
Property 6.8. If TGS T processes a valid request message naming a client C , and the key used to encrypt the TGT
which was contained in that request message was secret when the system started, then earlier the KAS K generated
a TGT naming C. Furthermore, if C’s private key was initially secret (so that C is honest), then C sent a request to
T after K sent a corresponding AS reply to C.
As a consequence, we see that even if the intruder is carrying out the attack by letting C login to T and S
as the intruder (so that the intruder can watch the trafﬁc between them), some KAS must have created a TGT
for the intruder, formalizing the requirement that the intruder be a legal user of the system. Furthermore, this
shows that while C might successfully ‘request’ a service ticket as the intruder in the attack scenario, it requires
the participation of the intruder; in particular, C could not obtain a TGT that names an honest client C ′ if the
relevant keys are secret.
Theorem 6.9 formalizes this property; the relevant MSR roles for the TG and CS exchanges can be found in
Appendix 7.
Theorem 6.9. If
(1) T :TGS ﬁres rule 4.1 consuming the fact N({AK ,C , tK }kT , {AK , n3, tK , T }k , C , S) and creating the fact
N(C , {SK ,C}kS , {SK , n3, S}AK) for someAK : shK C T ,C : client,K : KAS, tK : time, kT : dbK T , n3 : nonce,
S : server, and
(2) the fact I(kT ) does not appear in the trace and no fact in the initial state of the trace contained a fact of
positive kT -rank relative to {AK ,C , tK }, and
(3) the fact I(skC) is not inferable in the initial state of the trace for every skC : SecK pkC ,
then
(i) the KAS K earlier ﬁred rule 2.1, creating a fact N({CertK , [k ,Hk(CertC , [tC , n2]skC ,C , T , n1)]skK}pkC ,
C , {AK ,C , tK }kT , {AK , n1, tK , T }k) for some CertK , CertC : CertList, n1, n2 : nonce, and
(ii)C ﬁred rule 3.1, creating the fact N({AK ,C , tK }kT , {AK , n3, tK , T }k ,C , S) in a state later in the trace than the
state at which K ﬁred rule 2.1 producing the fact described above.
Proof. We start with consideration of kT -rank relative to (AK ,C , tK ). T ’s hypothesized rule ﬁring consumed a
fact for which this rank is positive, but by assumption this rank was 0 for every fact in the initial state of the
trace. Thus some rule ﬁring in the trace increased this rank.
Because I(kT ) does not appear in the initial state of the trace, by Lemma 6.13 this fact never appears in
the trace. Thus, by Lemma 6.11, the intruder cannot have increased kT -rank relative to (AK ,C , tK ), so some
honest principal must have done this. Inspection of the principal rules shows that if k has type dbK T for some
T : TGS, then the only honest principals that increase k-rank relative to any message are those of type KAS
through the ﬁring of rule 2.1. Thus some K : KAS ﬁred rule 2.1, which must have consumed and produced the
facts claimed.
We now show that AK is secret by considering {k , kT }-corank relative to AK . K ’s ﬁring of rule 2.1 freshly
generates AK , so all previous states had inﬁnite {k , kT }-corank relative to AK , and the state that results from this
rule ﬁring has {k , kT }-corank equal to 1 relative to AK . As noted above, I(kT ) never appears in the trace; we must
show that I(k) does not either. K ’s ﬁring of rule 2.1 also freshly generated k , so all previous states had inﬁnite
E-corank relative to k for every set E; furthermore, the resulting state has {skC}-corank equal to 1 relative to k .
Because I(skC) was not inferable from the initial state of the trace, by Lemma 6.14 this fact never appears in the
trace. Thus, by Lemma 6.12, the intruder cannot decrease {skC}-corank relative to k . Inspection of the principal
rules show that no honest principal will do this either; note that while C decrypts the message containing k , she
does not store this key, much less in a predicate that will allow it to be put onto the network. Therefore no state
in the trace has {skC}-corank equal to 0 relative to k , so I(k) never appears in the trace.
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Because neither I(kT ) nor I(k) ever appear in the trace, the intruder cannot decrease {k , kT }-corank relative
to AK . By inspection, we see that the only principal rule which decreases this corank is rule 2.1 when it is ﬁred
to freshly generate AK . As noted above, the resulting state must have {k , kT }-corank equal to 1 relative to AK ;
no principal rule will decrease this corank to 0. Thus no fact of {k , kT }-corank equal to 0 relative to AK , and in
particular the fact I(AK), appears in the trace.
We may now show that C ﬁred rule 3.1 in the claimed fashion. T ’s hypothesized rule ﬁring also consumed a
fact of AK-rank equal to 1 relative to C , tC . Because AK was freshly generated during the trace (as shown above)
and I(AK) never appears in the trace, some honest principal must have ﬁred a rule that increased AK-rank
relative to C , tC . By inspection, we see that the only such principal rule is rule 3.1, which must produce the fact
N(X , {C , tC}AK ,C , S , n3) for some X : msg, tC : time, S : server, and n3 : nonce. Because this fact has positive
AK-rank relative to C , tC and AK was freshly generated by K , we know that C’s ﬁring of rule 3.1 occurred after
K ’s ﬁring of rule 2.1. 
6.5. Lemmas
Anumber of lemmas giving conditions underwhich various ranks and coranks canbe increased anddecreased
by rule ﬁrings can be found in [42]. However, we need to add to them as public-key operations where not
considered in that work.
Lemma 6.10. If VerifySig(s;m; P ,Certs) holds, then for some pk : pubK P and sk : secK pk , the sk-rank of s
relative to m is positive.
Proof. Our assumptions about VerifySig imply that s is a valid signature of m under one of P ’s secret keys, i.e.,
for some pk : pubK P and sk : secK pk , s = [m]sk . Thus s has positive sk-rank relative to m. 
The following lemmas were proved in [42] for the formalizations of basic Kerberos considered there. These
property still holds here once we add asymmetric encryption and digital signatures.
Lemma 6.11. If an intruder rule R can increase k-rank relative to a messagem0, then the left-hand side of R contains
I(k).
Proof. By inspection of the intruder rules. 
Lemma 6.12. If m0 is not a principal name, time, or key of one of the types dbK I , shK I A (for A : TGS or
A : server), shK C I for C : client, or pubK P for P : principal, then any intruder rule that decreases E-corank
relative to m0 either contains I(k) in its left hand side for some k ∈ E or freshly generates m0.
Proof. By inspection of the intruder rules. 
The following lemma is an analog of Lemma 6 in [42]; the additional intruder rules do not change it.
Lemma 6.13. For any P : principal, P /= I , and k : dbK P , if I(k) does not appear in the initial state of the trace,
then I(k) does not appear in any state of the trace.
Proof. By inspection of the intruder rules. Because dbK P is not a subtype of msg, if P /= I then I(k) appears on
the right-hand side of a rule only if it also appears on the left-hand side. 
The next lemma is analogous to the previous one, but it refers to secret keys for asymmetric encryption
instead of the keys in the KAS’s database.
Lemma 6.14. For any P : principal, pubk : pubK P , P /= I , and k : secK pubk , if I(k) does not appear in the initial
state of the trace, then I(k) does not appear in any state of the trace.
Proof. By inspection of the intruder rules. Because secK pubk is not a subtype of msg, for k : secK pubk , the
only time I(k) may appear on the right-hand side of an intruder rule but not on the left-hand side is in rule SK ′,
in which case P = I . 
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7. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we describe our discovery of a man-in-the-middle attack against PKINIT [25], the public-key
extension to the popular Kerberos 5 authentication protocol [1]. The attack was found on PKINIT-25, but
applies to previous versions as well. We found this attack as part of an ongoing formal analysis of Kerberos,
which has previously yielded proofs of security for the core Kerberos 5 protocol [7,8] and its use for cross-realm
authentication [9]. We have used formal methods approaches to prove that, at an abstract level, several possible
defenses against our attack restore security properties of Kerberos 5 that are violated in PKINIT (as shown by
the attack); we also proved some security properties that do hold even for the vulnerable form of PKINIT. The
ﬁxes we analyzed include the one proposed by the IETF Kerberos Working Group, which included it in the
speciﬁcation of PKINIT starting with revision 27 [25]. Our attack was also addressed in a Microsoft security
bulletin affecting several versions of Windows [4] and mentioned in a CERT advisory [26].
As a continuationof this research,wehave carriedover someof the results examinedhere to the computational
model by expressing PKINIT and other aspects of Kerberos in the cryptographic library model of Backes,
Pﬁtzmann andWaidner (BPWmodel) [45]. Themain outcomeof this effort was that the ﬁxes examined herewere
proved to be correct at the cryptographic level [21]. The computationally sound proofs in the BPW model were
conducted symbolically by hand [21] and there appears to be a strong relation to the symbolic proof technique
used in this work. Gaining a better understanding of how these twomethods relate will be subject to future work.
If a suitable connection to the BPW framework is discovered, it could contribute to the automation of proof in
the cryptographicmodel [46], which will have the effect of speeding up the analysis work and, therefore, allowing
us to tackle larger protocols. We have also started to mechanically verify security properties of PKINIT directly
within the computational model [22] using Blanchet’s CryptoVerif tool [23,24].
We are also in the process of extending our analysis to the Difﬁe–Hellmanmode of PKINIT: our preliminary
observations suggest that it is immune from the attack described in this paper, but we do not yet have deﬁnite
results on other types of threats.
Appendix A. MSR roles for later exchanges
Here we recall theMSR roles for the TG and CS exchanges. These are the same as for basic Kerberos because
PKINIT only modiﬁes the AS exchange.
Fig. A.1 shows the client’s role in the TG exchange. The memory predicate AuthC(X , T ,AK) comes from the
AS exchange (formalized in Fig. 11 above).
Fig. A.1. The client’s role in TG exchange.
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Fig. A.2. The TGS’s role in the TG exchange.
Fig. A.3. The client’s role in the CS exchange.
Fig. A.4. The server’s role in the CS exchange.
Fig. A.2 shows the TGS’s role in the TG exchange. Figs. A.3 and A.4 show the client and server roles,
respectively, for the CS exchange.
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